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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The State Engineer of the State of Utah, hereinafter
referred to as the "State", is a respondent herein, and
believes it advisable to set out the facts which relate to the
actions of the State in this controversy, to clarify the
State's position.
It should be noted at the outset that this appeal
involves not only action taken by the State, but also
matters strictly between the parties and that the two
were joined in one lawsuit. As to those matters between
the private parties to this litigation, the State has no dfrect
interest and, therefore, has no comment on the Court's
decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The first matter involving the State to which a brief
statement will be made is the action taken by the State
upon the eight applications in question and the subsequent rulings of the trial court on these applications. It
was agreed at the pretrial conference by all of the parties
that the court should try the State's actions on all eight
of these applications in this one trial and make one set
of findings and one decree covering the court's decision
on the eight applications. (R. 159).
The State approved Applications Nos. 27404 and 27410
filed by Paul E. Reimann and the trial court affirmed this
approval (R. 119). The State Engineer had indicated to
applicant by letter dated April 24, 1957, that Applications
2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Nos. 27770 and 28106, filed by Paul E. Reimann, were
going to be approved and it was agreed at the pretrial by
the parties that this letter should be amended to include
Application No. 28555 (R. 157), and it was stipulated that
the action by the State on these three applications should
be tried as a part of this lawsuit (R. 158). The trial court
affirmed the approval of these three latter applications in
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment (R. 118 and 119).
The State rejected Application No. 24531 filed by Maybeth Farr Reimann, and Applications No. 24532 and 27987
filed by Paul E. Reimann; the trial court upheld the rejection of Application No. 27987 but reversed the decision
of the State Engineer as to Applications Nos. 24531 and
24532 and ordered these two applications approved.
The State does not appeal the court's order approving
Applications Nos. 24531 and 24532 because as indicated in
the State's memorandum decision (R. 18, 19 and 20) rejecting these applications, they involved questions of nonuse, adverse use and the effect of a prior court decree
which were problems which could ultimately be decided
only by the court. The State, therefore, left the parties
status quo to enable the court to properly determine these
n1atters. A similar decision was rendered by the State in
the case of Application No. 27987.
The approval by the State of the other applications
in the group was based on the theory that these were
developed spring areas and, therefore, applicants were not
taking water tributary to Mountair Creek. This was one
of the basic issues at trial (R. 160-161) and goes ultimately
to the question of whether there is in fact unappropriated
3
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water in Mountair Canyon. It was the State's intention
to leave this matter to the parties (R. 185). However, the
State did, at the request of the court, (R. 907), make additional studies in the area during the trial of this case,
which led to the State's concern as to how the determination of the·· rights of these parties might affect or interfere with lower rights in the drainage basin below Mountair Canyon.
It was realized that the problem of lower users was
not then before the court, and would only be brought
before the court at a later date, within the context of a
general adjudication of all the water in this area. However,
the State believes the court has judiciously provided for
such later adjudication in paragraphs 10 and 11 (R. 119)
of the judgment and decree wherein it is provided that
the applications and the court's decision thereon are subject to all existing vested water rights in this source and
that the judgment is without prejudice to any third party
rights which may be determined in any future general
adjudication proceedings in this drainage area.

Under these circumstances the State believes its
interests as to the eight applications in question are fully
protected by the trial court and will, therefore, leave any
further comment on these rights to the parties.
However, the State believes it is in a somewhat
different position in regards to the determination by the
court that a flow of 650 gallons per day is adequate to
supply one home in this area. The courts finding was
based on information supplied by the State in their study
4
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noted above, (R. 907). The State presented testimony at
trial to sustain the figure of 650 gallons per day per
cabin and the court adopted this figure as the reasonable
beneficial requirements of one home in this canyon. The
State will confine its argument to this single point.
STATEMENTS OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE WATER USERS IN MOUNTAIR
CANYON COULD ONLY BENEFICIALLY USE A
MAXIMUM OF 650 GALLONS A DAY PER HOME
FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE WATER USERS IN MOUNT AIR
CANYON COULD ONLY BENEFICIALLY USE A
MAXIMUM OF 650 GALLONS A DAY PER HOME
FOR DOMESTIC PURPOSES.
It is uncontested that the
Mountair Canyon is a beneficial
be resolved by this court is the
use. It is the contention of the
possible beneficial use of water
gallons per day.

present use of water in
one, the only question to
extent of such beneficial
State that the maximum
for any one home is 650

That the beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure
and the limit of the right to use water is one of the most
fundamental principles of water law in the State of Utah,
Section 73-1-3, U.C.A. 1953.
5
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It is also the public policy in this state that conservation of water is of utmost importance to the public welfare, Brian v. Fremont Irrigation Co., 112 U. 220, 186 P.
2d 558, and, further, that it is against the public policy of
this state to permit the waste of water, Little Cottonwood
Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 U. 243, 289 P. 116.
When an individual appropriates water in Utah, even
if he has prior rights, he must use it in a reasonable manner and no more can be appropriated for a purpose than
will reasonably meet the need. The Utah Supreme Court
stated in In Re Water Rights of Escalante Valley Drainage
A.rea, 10 U. 2d 77, 348 P. 2d 679, the following on the extent
of a prior appropriator's rights:

"* * * that a prior appropriator does not have an
unlimited right to the use of water, but is subject
to a reasonable limitation of his right for the benefit of junior appropriators. That it is necessary
and proper to limit prior appropriators to the volume of water reasonably required to raise crops
under reasonably efficient methods of applying
water to the land. That beneficial use is the basis
and the measure and the limit to the use of water
and water used in excess of the amount reasonably
necessary to produce crops is not beneficially used."
Although this case involved waters being applied for
irrigation purposes, the same principle is involved in the
instant case, and the State submits the finding of 650 gallons per day per home was correct and proper as the
amount reasonably required to satisfy a home use.

It was the testimony of Hubert C. Lambert, Deputy
State Engineer, that the State Engineer's Office had made
6
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extensive studies on the amount of water needed for a
family for domestic purposes (R. 1055). He stated that
based on such studies his office had arrived at the figure
of 650 gallons of water per day per family and that this
took into account all of the inside household needs of the
family, but did not take into consideration the water
requirements of a lawn (R. 1056). He further testified
that the figure of 650 gallons is the amount needed by the
family to carry on normal activities whether consumed
or used for non-consumptive purposes (R. 1057).
The State Engineer's Office did not consider the types
of diversions in reaching its determination of household
requirements of these homes inasmuch as its investigation
was limited to a study of the beneficial use requirements
of normal household use (R. 1058-1059).
Appellants express concern, on page 17 of their brief,
at the State's failure to consider the nature of the diversion
works and the absence of storage facilities for each of the
cabins in its study. They also point out that other witnesses gave testimony that more water would be needed
than 650 gallons and that this would be necessary at the
peak flow rate of use. The citations to the record noted
by appellants disclose no more than the opinion of certain
witnesses which are not based upon any actual measurements by the witness as to beneficial use requirements.
The court had before it the opinion of appellant and
of the State and it simply chose to take the State's opinion
as the more sound. Appellants contend that they are
entitled to a certain flow during the peak periods of the
7
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day, and we agree that an appropriator is entitled to a
flow of water in accordance with his appropriation, so long
as that flow is reasonable and not excessive or wasteful.
While flow must be determined in defining a water right
in its entirety, and in any domestic system storage may
be desirable to attain a constant flow, still the water user
can only beneficially use a certain amount of water notwithstanding the rate at which the water is diverted.
The State feels that this flow is a distinct and seperate
problem and does not bear on a determination of the total
beneficial use requirements for any given use of water
once delivered. It is agreed that the use of water in a
home is usually concentrated into peak use periods during
the day; however, this fact is not peculiar to Mountair
Canyon but is the universal rule in any domestic water
system.
However, to take the peak uses of the water and times
that by the number of hours in the day would be a completely erroneous method of arriving at the total beneficial use requirements of a home since there are great
portions of the day and night when use in the home is
relatively small and some periods wliere they may be no
use at all. The flow is independent from how much water
the home can beneficially use in one day once that water
is delivered. We realize that in most homes the amount
of water will probably vary somewhat from day to day,
depending on what household activities are taking place.
However, the figure submitted by the State Engineer's
Office is calculated not on the average need but on that
amount sufficient to satisfy any reasonable household
need. (R. 1056).
8
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One of the essentials of a valid appropriation of water
is that a definite quantity of water be applied to a useful
and beneficial purpose. Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 U. 50,
40 P. 2d 755. We contend that the definite quantity here
appropriated could not exceed 650 gallons per day per
home and still be beneficial. Any excessive award to these
home owners would prove detrimental to this whole stream
system, since these individuals would have paper rights
to more water than they were actually beneficially using,
and this would have the effect of discouraging further
development of this water source by other appropriators
contrary to the public policy of this state.
CONCLUSION
The individual water user in the State of Utah can
only gain a right to the use of water to the extent of his
beneficial requirements thereof. The trial court had a
sound basis upon which to make a finding that the beneficial requirements of a home were limited to 650 gallons
per day. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court in this
respect should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
DALLIN W. JENSEN
Assistant Attorney General
RICHARD R. BOYLE
Assistant Attorney General
RICHARD R. BOYLE
Attorneys for Respondent,
Utah State Engineer
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